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SHAPERO V. KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION
N 1985, Richard D. Shapero, a Louisville, Kentucky, lawyer, asked the
Kentucky Attorneys' Advertising Commission for permission to send a
letter to homeowners facing foreclosure.' Shapero's proposed corre-
spondence was essentially a recommendation of his services.2 The Commis-
sion found the letter violative of a Kentucky Supreme Court rule prohibiting
advertisements targeted toward individuals with particular legal problems. 3
The Commission, however, proffered its opinion with a recommendation
that the Kentucky Supreme Court amend the rule because the rule violated
the first amendment 4 under the 1985 case of Zauderer v. Office of Discipli-
nary Counsel.5
Shapero then asked the Kentucky Bar Association's Ethics Committee for
an advisory opinion as to the rule's validity. 6 The Ethics Committee found
1. The Advertising Commission is responsible for aiding attorneys in ethical advertising
so as to protect the public. KY. REV. STAT. ANN., Ky. Sup. Ct. Rule 3.135(3)(a) (Michie
1988).
2. The proposed letter read in part:
It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on. If this is
true, you may be about to lose your home. Federal law may allow you to keep
your home by ORDERING your creditor [sic] to STOP and give you more time
to pay them.
Call NOW, don't wait. It may surprise you what I may be able to do for you.
•.. Remember it is FREE, there is NO charge for calling.
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1916, 1919, 100 L. Ed. 2d 475, 482 (1988).
3. The rule prohibited the mailing of written advertisements precipitated by a specific
event or occurrence involving the addressee as distinct from the general public. KY. REV.
STAT. ANN., Ky. Sup. Ct. Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) (Michie 1988).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the free-
dom of speech." The first amendment is made applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment, which states that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that states could not ban
nontargeted advertisements containing legal advice similar to that in Shapero's letter.
6. An attorney in doubt as to the propriety of any professional act may seek an advisory
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the rule consistent with rule 7.3 of the American Bar Association's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules).7 Consequently, Shapero peti-
tioned the Kentucky Supreme Court for a review of the Ethics Committee's
advisory opinion.A The court found the rule unconstitutional, yet merely
replaced it with ABA Model Rule 7.3, which contained a virtually identical
prohibition against targeted, direct-mail solicitation. 9 Since Shapero's pro-
posed letter solicited potential clients known to face a specific legal problem,
the rule still prohibited the letter.10 The Louisville lawyer ultimately ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court. Held, reversed and remanded:
A state may not, without violating the first and fourteenth amendments, cat-
egorically ban lawyers from soliciting business for pecuniary gain by sending
truthful, nondeceptive letters to potential clients known to face particular
legal problems. Such advertising is constitutionally protected commercial
speech, which may be restricted only in the service of a substantial govern-
mental interest, and only through means that directly advance that interest.
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, 108 S. Ct. 1916, 100 L. Ed. 2d 475
(1988).
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
OF TARGETED, DIRECT-MAIL ADVERTISING
A. The Commercial Speech Doctrine
Constitutional protection of targeted, direct-mailings by attorneys has as
its precedential genesis the watershed case of Bates v. State Bar." In 1976,
the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility banned all forms of
attorney advertising.' 2 The following year's Bates decision, however, held
that the blanket suppression of attorney advertising violated the free speech
clause of the first amendment. 13 The Bates controversy involved two attor-
neys who had placed an advertisement in a Phoenix, Arizona, newspaper.' 4
opinion from a special committee of the Kentucky Bar. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN., Ky. Sup. Ct.
Rule 3.530 (Michie 1988).
7. Rule 7.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client
with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by mail,
in-person or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the
lawyer's pecuniary gain. The term "solicit" includes contact in person, by tele-
phone or telegraph, by letter or other writing, or by other communication di-
rected to a specific recipient, but does not include letters addressed or
advertising circulars distributed generally to persons not known to need legal
services of the kind provided by the lawyer in a particular matter, but who are
so situated that they might in general find such services useful.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1987).
8. For a report on Shapero's advisory opinion, see Underwood, Advisory Opinions, Ky.
BENCH & BAR, Winter 1985-86, at 32.
9. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 726 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Ky. 1987).
10. The court's opinion remained curiously silent as to what was unconstitutional about
the Kentucky rule, and exactly how rule 7.3 remedied the situation. Id.
11. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
12. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A) (1976).
13. 433 U.S. at 384.
14. Id. at 354.
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The advertisement offered legal services at "very reasonable" fees, and listed
prices for routine services such as uncontested divorces and personal bank-
ruptcies.15 The Arizona Supreme Court dismissed the attorneys' claims that
the state rule prohibiting their advertisement violated the first amendment.1 6
In deciding the Bates question, the Court relied upon Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,17 in which the Court
had recently given commercial speech first amendment protection.1 8 The
Court concluded that truthful attorney advertising concerning the availabil-
ity and terms of routine legal services merited first amendment protection.' 9
The majority added, however, that states could continue to restrain false,
deceptive, or misleading attorney advertising. 20 Although narrow, the Bates
holding granted attorneys a privilege denied them for almost seventy years. 21
While Bates set the stage for further expansion, the opinion left unclear how
far the Court would go in broadening this now constitutionally protected
privilege. 22
B. The Distinction Between In-Person Solicitation and
Solicitation by Letter
In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association 2 3 and In re Prim us,24 companion
cases decided just a year after Bates, the Supreme Court helped define the
15. The dissent strenuously asserted that whether a service was "routine" depended upon
the eye of the beholder. Since the public was unable to discern exactly what service they
required, they needed protection. Id. at 392 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting).
16. See 17A ARIZ. REV. STAT., Sup. Ct. Rules, Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule
29(a), DR 2-101(B) (1976) (Arizona rule prohibiting certain advertisements).
17. 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (advertisement giving prescription drug prices was protected by
the first amendment notwithstanding its commercial speech character). The Court gave first
amendment protection to commercial speech for the first time the previous year. See Bigelow
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (fact that advertisement in question reflected commercial in-
terests did not negate all first amendment protection). The Court created a "commercial
speech doctrine" in 1980. See infra text accompanying notes 39-41.
18. The Supreme Court originally denied commercial speech first amendment protection
in 1942. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (first amendment not applicable if
motive for communication primarily profit-oriented). See also Head v. New Mexico Bd. of
Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 (1963) (allowing state to prohibit radio station from
broadcasting optometrists' advertisements); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 349 U.S. 925 (1955)
(statute outlawing solicitation of eyeglasses constitutional); Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341
U.S. 622 (1951) (denying magazine distributor right to solicit subscriptions door-to-door).
19. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977). The Court emphasized that it was ad-
dressing only routine services, not the quality of such services. The Court similarly disre-
garded the issue of in-person solicitation. Id. at 383.
20. Id.
21. Lawyer advertising was considered acceptable before the 20th century. Note, In re
R.M.J.: Easing Restrictions on Attorney Advertising, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 455, 456 (1982). The
ABA ban started in 1908. See 33 A.B.A. REP. 566, 582 (1908) (reprinting letter from Com-
mittee on Code of Professional Ethics allowing only "newspaper cards," containing name,
address, telephone number, and specialization of the attorney). See generally Radin, Mainte-
nance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 48-57 (1935) (extending theory that attorney
advertising proscription has roots in English common law, which followed the Greek and
Roman law in prohibiting champerty).
22. For a discussion of the Bates aftermath, see Baker, You Can Advertise Now-But
Should You?, BARRISTER, Summer 1981, at 14.
23. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
24. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
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limits of first amendment protection for attorneys' advertisements by distin-
guishing between in-person solicitation and solicitation by letter.25 This dis-
tinction assisted in building a foundation for the constitutionality of
targeted, direct-mailings by attorneys.26 In Ohralik an Ohio attorney had
approached two persons involved in an automobile accident, coercing them
into entering contingent-fee contracts. 27 While the Bates Court expressly
declined to address the issue of in-person solicitation, 28 the Ohralik Court
definitively held that a state could ban all attorneys from personally solicit-
ing clients for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to pose dangers the
state had a right to prevent. 29 In Primus the Court overruled a state repri-
mand of a South Carolina ACLU attorney who solicited by mail a client
sterilized as a condition to her receiving public medical assistance.30 The
Court stressed that since the lawyer's motivation stemmed from a concern
for those unable to vindicate their own rights, rather than pecuniary inter-
ests, the state possessed no interest in the matter to which it might
subordinate the lawyer's first amendment rights.3 1
Ohralik and Primus defined the limits of permissibility within the solicita-
tion spectrum. Standing at opposite ends, the cases clarified a standard of
analysis that would classify a lawyer's marketing efforts as either a forbidden
form of in-person solicitation, or as a permissible form of advertising.3 2
Thus, they introduced a process by which the Court could more comprehen-
sibly classify future attorney advertising cases.
C. The Mailing of Professional Announcement Cards
and the Central Hudson Test
In In re R.MJ. 33 the Court granted first amendment protection to an at-
torney who had mailed professional announcement cards. The Court's deci-
sion clarified questions that remained after Bates and resolved conflicting
25. The Ohralik Court distinguished Bates on the grounds that Bates applied to pure
speech advertising in a newspaper while "[iun-person solicitation by a lawyer of remunerative
employment is a business transaction in which speech is an essential but subordinate compo-
nent." Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457.
26. See generally Thurman, Direct Mail: Advertising or Solicitation? A Distinction With-
out a Difference, 11 STETSON L. REV. 403 (1982) (assesses the implications of the Court's
distinction).
27. The attorney used a hidden tape recorder.
28. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 366 (1977).
29. 436 U.S. at 447. The Court expressed concern over the particular danger of attorneys
soliciting victims incapable of making informed judgments. Id.
30. The client's first exposure to the attorney was during a lecture at which the lawyer
offered free legal advice. 436 U.S. at 413.
31. Id. at 422. The Court based its decision primarily on NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963) (lawyers exonerated from assisting persons seeking legal redress for violations of
their constitutional rights); 436 U.S. at 422; see also United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401
U.S. 576 (1971) (railway union members had first amendment right to advise fellow workers of
legal rights); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (labor union given
constitutional right to advise injured members of availability of legal assistance).
32. See Balzer, Attorney Advertising: Who's Really Afraid of the Big Bad Lawyer?, 22
NEW ENG. L. REV. 727, 727-31 (1988).
33. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
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district court opinions in mass-mailing cases. 34 Specifically, the decision so-
lidified a lawyer's constitutional right to mail to the general public advertise-
ments not actually or inherently misleading. 35
The R.M.J Court considered the constitutionality of a Missouri Discipli-
nary Rule36 that allowed lawyers to advertise in newspapers, magazines, and
the telephone directory yellow pages, provided the advertisements were
within one of the rule's ten acceptable categories. 37 The rule also limited the
mailing of professional announcement cards to persons specifically enumer-
ated in the rule. In R.MJ. the attorney violated the Missouri Disciplinary
Rule by mailing cards to persons other than lawyers, clients, personal
friends, and relatives. 38 The Court unequivocally struck down Missouri's
prohibition and applied a new standard to the attorney advertising debate.
The Court adopted the commercial speech test it had created two years prior
in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission. 39
The Central Hudson test consists of a four-part analysis:40 First, is the
advertising activity truthful and lawful? Second, is the government's interest
in opposing the expression substantial? If the responses to these two ques-
tions are positive, then the third question is, does the governmental regula-
tion directly advance the asserted interest? Finally, is the governmental
regulation more extensive than is necessary to serve the asserted interest?4 '
In applying the test, the R.MJ. Court held that the cards did not mislead
persons receiving them and that the state had neither presented a substantial
interest in banning the information,4 2 nor attempted a less restrictive
alternative.43
D. Unsolicited Advice
The Court applied first amendment protection to legal advertisements
34. Compare Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978) (dismissing com-
plaint against attorneys who had mailed letters to real estate agents) and In re Appert, 315
N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1981) (holding unconstitutional a rule prohibiting lawyers from mass-
mailing information describing dangers of Dalkon Shield) with Eaton v. Supreme Court, 270
Ark. 573, 607 S.W.2d 55 (1980) (prohibiting legal advertisement enclosed in mass-mailing
packet), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981) and State v. Moses, 231 Kan. 243, 642 P.2d 1004(1982) (disallowing attorney's mass-mailing campaign for employment for particular legal
matter).
35. See generally Note, In re R.M.J.: Easing Restrictions on Attorney Advertising, 23 S.
TEx. L.J. 455 (1982).
36. In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. at 194 n.3 (citing Mo. REV. STAT., Sup. Ct. Rule 4, DR 2-
101(B) (1978) (Index Vol.)).
37. The attorney had deviated from the acceptable "laundry list" of categories by includ-
ing a statement that he was permitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court.
The lawyer had also wandered from required language for describing particular areas of prac-
tice such as "personal injury." Id. at 197.
38. Id. at 196.
39. 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (state ban on promotional advertising by electric utilities violated
first amendment).
40. Id. at 566.
41. Id.




containing unsolicited advice" in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Coun-
sel.45 The Court did so by relying on the commercial speech doctrine46 and
the Central Hudson test.4 7 While Bates and R.MJ. dealt solely with lawyer
dissemination of general information, the Zauderer Court confronted adver-
tisements directed at specific legal problems.48
At issue in Zauderer was an advertisement 49 containing an illustration of
the Dalkon Shield IUD.50 The publication informed readers that if the de-
vice had injured them, a suit"1 against the manufacturer might be possible.52
The Ohio Office of Disciplinary Counsel claimed that the advertisement vio-
lated disciplinary rules prohibiting self-recommendation, accepting employ-
ment resulting from unsolicited legal advice, and the use of illustrations.5 3
Utilizing the Central Hudson test, the Court held that since the advertise-
ment was not false or deceptive, the state had the burden of proving the ban
directly supportive of a substantial governmental interest.5 4 The majority
disregarded the state's attempt to equate its interests with those that justified
banning the in-person solicitation at issue in Ohralik.5 In distinguishing
Ohralik, the Court alleged that print advertising, as opposed to in-person
solicitation, presented comparatively little danger to consumers.56 Further,
the Court highlighted the fact that print advertising lacked the coercive
force of the personal presence of a trained advocate.57 The Zauderer Court's
standards of analysis58 established a basis for the Court's next confrontation
with attorney advertising, Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association.5 9
44. The illustrative newspaper advertisement at issue in Zauderer advised injured users of
the Dalkon Shield IUD to inquire about suing the manufacturer.
45. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
46. Id. at 637. By 1985 the Court had firmly established that truthful, nondeceptive ad-
vertising deserved first amendment protection in the absence of a substantial governmental
interest. Id. at 638. For analogous Supreme Court cases where the state did not meet this
requirement, see Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rela-
tions Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
47. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637. For the Central Hudson test, see supra text accompanying
notes 40 & 41.
48. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 629.
49. Actually, two advertisements were at issue in Zauderer. The second advertisement
extended legal service to drunk-driving defendants. The publication promised to refund the
full legal fee if the client were convicted. The Court upheld the Ohio court's reprimand for
this advertisement because it failed to mention plea bargaining. If the defendant pleaded guilty
to a lesser charge, he or she would still be liable for attorney's fees; therefore, the advertise-
ment was deceptive. Id. at 654.
50. The device was inserted into the womb to prevent conception. The Shield was with-
drawn from the market in 1974 since it was associated with numerous internal injuries. See
generally Note, The Food and Drug Administration's Power to Recall a Harmful Product and
Other Remedial Actions: The Powerless Consumer, 10 VT. L. REV. 129 (1985).
51. 106 women initiated lawsuits as a direct result of the advertisement.
52. 471 U.S. at 631.
53. See OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A), 2-101(B) (1983).
54. 471 U.S. at 644.
55. Id. at 641.
56. Id. at 642.
57. Id.
58. See generally Note, Protected Solicitation Becomes More Personal: Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 167 (1986).
59. 108 S. Ct. 1916, 100 L. Ed. 2d 475 (1988).
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II. SHAPERO v. KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION
A. Defining the Issue
While the Supreme Court addressed various forms of lawyer advertising
in the eleven years following Bates, it never considered targeted direct-mail-
ings.6° Shapero presented the first opportunity for the Court to consider the
constitutionality of this method of advertising. 6' In Shapero the Court con-
sidered whether a state could constitutionally prohibit attorneys from solicit-
ing legal business for pecuniary gain by sending truthful, nondeceptive
letters to potential clients known to face particular legal problems. 62 In con-
cluding that the state could not absolutely ban such advertising, Justice
Brennan based his majority opinion 63 on two premises. First, as Zauderer
recently held, 64 such attorney advertising qualified as constitutionally pro-
tected commercial speech in the absence of an overriding governmental in-
terest. 65 Second, the value of free-flowing consumer information outweighed
the state's claim of difficulty in regulating against abusive targeted letters. 66
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice O'Connor and joined in by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, agreed that Zauderer could fairly ex-
tend to protect targeted, direct-mailings; however, the dissent disputed the
underlying rationales of Zauderer and the previous Supreme Court attorney
advertising cases. 67
B. Analysis of Majority Opinion
The Shapero Court began by reaffirming the constitutionally protected sta-
tus of lawyer advertising. 68 Reciting the standards of analysis it had applied
60. The Court had refused to hear numerous lower court cases dealing with targeted mail-
ings. See In re Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1984) (blanket
prohibition of mail solicitation of accident victims violated attorney's first amendment rights of
expression), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1007 (1985); Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412
N.E.2d 927, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1980) (direct-mail solicitation of 7,500 individual real property
owners by lawyers was constitutionally protected commercial speech that could be regulated
but not proscribed), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981); Dayton Bar Ass'n v. Herzog, 70 Ohio
St. 2d 261, 436 N.E.2d 1037 (permanent disbarment of attorney who had mailed between 500
and 1000 letters to defendants in municipal court cases listed in the "Daily Court Reporter"),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982).
61. While the Supreme Court had not addressed targeted mailings, state courts had been
dealing with the issue with varied results. For a background discussion of the rationales used
by the state courts, see Maute, Scrutinizing Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation Rules Under
Commercial Speech and Antitrust Doctrine, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 520-26 (1986).
62. 108 S. Ct. at 1919, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 485.
63. Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and Kennedy joined Justice Brennan in
the decision of the Court with respect to whether Kentucky's rule was valid. Only Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Kennedy joined Justice Brennan in part III of the opinion, which
addressed the issue of whether Shapero's particular proposed letter was valid. Justices White
and Stevens filed a separate opinion concurring in the first two parts, while dissenting to part
III, claiming that the particular letter's validity should be left to the state court in the first
instance. Id. at 1919, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 476.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 44-57.
65. 108 S. Ct. at 1921, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 483.
66. Id. at 1924, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 487.
67. Id. at 1925, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 489.
68. Id. at 1921, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 483.
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in prior cases, the Court underscored the precept that nondeceptive commer-
cial speech deserved first amendment protection unless the state could assert
a substantial governmental interest. 69 Justice Brennan emphasized that its
Central Hudson test invalidated state rules broader than necessary to prevent
the perceived danger. 70
Next, the Court noted specifically the Zauderer decision, which had nulli-
fied an Ohio rule that categorically banned solicitation of legal employment
for monetary gain through advertisements, even if truthful, directed at spe-
cific legal problems. 71 Justice Brennan stressed that while the Court readily
distinguished between in-person solicitation and written advertisements, it
had never made a distinction between differing modes of written general ad-
vertisements. 72 Thus, the majority reasoned, constitutional protection ex-
tended as readily to mass-mailed advertisements as it did to general
advertisements. 73 The Court then hinted at the absurdity of ABA Model
Rule 7.3.74 Justice Brennan explained that Kentucky could not constitu-
tionally prohibit Shapero's letter if the attorney hypothetically altered it, in
conformance with rule 7.3, to begin with the words, "Is your home being
foreclosed on?", rather than the targeted, "It has come to my attention that
.... ,,75 The Court illustrated the frailty of the Kentucky Supreme Court's
argument in lower court by showing how a slight alteration of words would
place the advertisement in compliance with the statute.76
The state had successfully banned Shapero's proposed letter simply be-
cause it targeted particular persons, rather than those situated within a gen-
eral group. 77 Justice Brennan pointed out that the only reason for sending
an advertisement to a general group was to reach particular persons within
that group in need of the service.78 The Court stated that mere efficiency of
speech did not deny that speech first amendment protection. 79 In further
support of its argument, the majority responded to the lower court's claim
that targeted mailings were as likely to overwhelm potential clients as were
in-person solicitations.80 Justice Brennan maintained that an untargeted let-
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1921, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 484.
72. Justice Brennan referred to Bates and R.M.J. in noting "[o]ur lawyer advertising cases
have never distinguished among various modes of written advertising to the general public."
Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.; see supra note 7.
75. 108 S. Ct. at 1921, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 484.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. The American Bar Association itself recommended direct-mailings (where per-
mitted by state codes of professional responsibility), since they provided the "[a]bility to reach
a specific target audience." See A. FOLEY, EFFECTIVE MARKETING OF LEGAL SERVICES
THROUGH ADVERTISING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR LAWYERS 38 (1985).
79. 108 S. Ct. at 1921-22, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 484.
80. Id. at 1922, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 485. In prohibiting Shapero's letter, the Kentucky
Supreme Court stated: "General mailings not addressed to a specific situation do not have the
same danger for abuse as direct targeted mailing." Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 726
S.W.2d 299, 301 (Ky. 1987).
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ter or newspaper advertisement, both of which receive constitutional protec-
tion, could distress a consumer just as much as a targeted letter.8' The
relevant inquiry in assessing potential for undue influence, the Court as-
serted, should focus not on the condition of the client, but rather on the
mode of communication. 82
As it had done in earlier cases, the Court discussed the potential risks
involved in expanding the constitutional protection of lawyer advertising.8 3
In concluding that targeted mailings, like print advertising, posed less poten-
tial for abuse than in-person solicitation, Justice Brennan listed factors dis-
tinguishing targeted letters from in-person solicitation.84 The majority
reasoned that targeted mailings afforded consumers time for reflection, thus
allowing them to consider fully the consequences of their decisions.85 In the
Court's view, the possibility of isolated incidents of abuse did not justify an
absolute ban on targeted mailings.8 6
Finally, the Court adduced that states could regulate and minimize abuse
through measures far less restrictive than total prohibition. 7 Justice Bren-
nan suggested, for example, a requirement that attorneys file any solicitation
letter with a state agency for approval.88 Acknowledging the lower court's
concern that state agencies had scant resources and lack of expertise, the
Court contended that the scrutiny of targeted letters would be no more diffi-
cult, or less accurate, than the scrutiny of advertisements. 89 In concluding
its argument, the majority recognized that its holding would create more
work for the state regulating agencies, but that the free flow of commercial
information more than justified any additional burden. 90
C. Analysis of Dissenting Opinion
In dissent, Justice O'Connor prefaced her analysis by agreeing with the
majority that the reasoning of Zauderer supported the Court's decision. 9'
Nevertheless, the dissent characterized the premises of Zauderer and the line
of cases supporting it as based upon defective premises and flawed reason-
ing. 92 Justice O'Connor felt public policy interests required a reexamination
of the entire framework of the Court's previous attorney-advertising
rationales. 93
81. 108 S. Ct. at 1922, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 485,
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1923, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 486.
84. Consumers were unpressured by letters since they could simply avert their eyes or
place the correspondence in a drawer. Id. at 1922-23, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 486.
85. Id. at 1923, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 486.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. The Court further associated targeted mailings with general advertisements by em-
phasizing the state agencies' ability to supervise and penalize abuses of materials "open to
public scrutiny." Id.
89. Id. at 1923, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 487.
90. Id. at 1924, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 487.





In defending its position, the dissent offered reasons why the Court should
show deference to the state's efforts at regulating its own attorneys.94 Justice
O'Connor stressed the key distinctions between professional services and
other marketable commodities. a 5 Justice O'Connor argued that while con-
sumers could evaluate ordinary goods, they lacked the ability to appraise
legal services.96 To equate legal services with ordinary consumer goods, the
dissent stated, created the chance for attorneys to subordinate their profes-
sional standards to the pursuit of a dollar.97 Thus, states had an obligation
to regulate attorney advertising to protect both the consumer and the integ-
rity of the legal profession. 98
Justice O'Connor stated that since a targeted, personalized letter from an
attorney arrived with the concomitant authority of the law, the layperson
would accord the letter greater weight than an ordinary advertisement. 99
Additionally, the dissent pointed to the difficulties in regulating targeted
mailings. 1°° Since a targeted letter could escape the sight of the bar in gen-
eral, attorneys would be more inclined to follow their pecuniary interests
than to keep foremost in mind their obligations to clients.101 The dissent
then acknowledged the valid distinction between in-person solicitation and
advertisements, but contended that this distinction did not invalidate as a
matter of course any distinction between targeted mailing and general
advertisements. 102
The dissent next argued that political speech, and not commercial speech,
was actually at the root of the first amendment. 103 Thus, Justice O'Connor
contended, the Court had erred in the breadth of its Virginia Pharmacy com-
mercial speech doctrine. 104 The dissent asserted that the Central Hudson
test for commercial speech could justify limited attorney advertisements,
such as initial consultation fee information, but that anything more expan-
sive would confuse and mislead the consumer. 105
In conclusion, the dissent emphasized the professional status of lawyers,
and probed what it felt was the real cost to society of reducing the restraints
on attorney advertising. 106 Justice O'Connor acknowledged the classic argu-
94. Id.
95. Justice O'Connor referred specifically to Shapero's free initial advice over the phone
as having serious consequences if the layperson were to evaluate the legal service incorrectly.
The dissent warned that free unsolicited advice would most likely be colored by the lawyer's
interest in generating business. Id. at 1925-26, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 489.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1928, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 493.
98. Id.
99. Justice O'Connor equated the influence of attorneys with that of policemen. Id. at
1926, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 490.
100. Id.
101. Id. For a background discussion of the ethical considerations unique to attorney ad-
vertising, see Moss, The Ethics of Law Practice Marketing, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 601
(1986).
102. 108 S. Ct. at 1926, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 490.
103. Id. at 1926, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 490-91.
104. Id. at 1927, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 491; see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
105. 108 S. Ct. at 1928, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 492.
106. Id. at 1928-31, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 493-96.
[Vol. 421008
ments in favor of lawyer advertising: decreased costs and increased effi-
ciency.10 7 Nevertheless, the dissent termed these temporary gains,
secondary to the enduring benefits attorney restrictions produced for soci-
ety.10 8 Justice O'Connor stressed that since attorneys constitute a powerful,
specialized body of experts, restraints remind them of their ethical obliga-
tions to society, and check the economic self-interests that their position al-
lows them to fulfill.109
III. CONCLUSION
As the first Supreme Court case to address targeted, direct-mail advertis-
ing by attorneys, Shapero concluded that a state could not categorically ban
this method of advertising. The Court looked to its Central Hudson test,
holding that a state could not ban truthful commercial speech unless it could
present a substantial, overriding governmental interest. The majority em-
phasized that Zauderer had already given attorneys the right to distribute
generally written advertising materials, on the grounds that these advertise-
ments did not present the same threat of coercion that justified banning in-
person solicitations. Thus, the majority reasoned, a letter mailed to a partic-
ular individual did not lose first amendment protection simply because it was
not mailed to the public at large. In dismissing the dissent's argument that
states could not adequately regulate targeted letters, the Court held that the
benefits of free-flowing consumer information outweighed any problems of
regulation. As lawyers take advantage of this now constitutionally protected
privilege, consumers are likely to find their mailboxes increasingly filled with
solicitations directed at their particular legal circumstances.
Peter J. Gunas III
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